Dewey and Foucault: What's the Problem? by Rabinow, Paul
  
11 
 
 
 
 Paul Rabinow 2011 
ISSN: 1832-5203 
Foucault Studies, No. 11, pp. 11-19, February 2011 
 
ARTICLE 
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Paul Rabinow, University of California 
 
ABSTRACT:  This article explicates a valuable but under-noticed point of contact between 
John Dewey and Michel Foucault.  Both agreed that thinking arose in the context of problems 
such that the work of thought for both proceeds by way of working through and working over 
problems.  Both affirmed that thinking arose in problematic situations; that it was about clari-
fying those situations, and that ultimately it was directed towards achieving a degree of reso-
lution of what was problematic in the situation.  Both agreed that thinking—or inquiry—was 
not fundamentally about the representations of a situation; either those produced by a con-
temporary thinker or as an exercise directed at historical materials.  Both agreed that a history 
of ideas as autonomous entities, distorted not only the process of thinking as a practice, but 
also the reasons for which it had been engaged in, often with a certain seriousness and urgen-
cy, the first place: that is to say, such approaches covered over the stakes.  Both agreed that the 
stakes involved something experiential and entailed a form of logic (or in Foucault’s later vo-
cabulary a mode of ‘veridiction’), in which the thinker could not help but be involved. 
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I am puzzled by the fact that persons who are systematically engaged with inquiry into 
questions, into problems (as philosophers certainly are), are so incurious about the 
existence and nature of problems1 
  
By ‘thinking’, I mean an analysis of what one might call the intensifying venues of 
experience (des foyers d’expérience), where are articulated one with the others: first, 
forms of a possible knowledge; second, the normative matrices of comportment for 
individuals; and finally, third, modes of virtual existence for possible subjects2  
                                                 
1 John Dewey, ‚Propositions, Warranted Assertibility and Truth,‛ in The Later Works of John Dewey, Volume 
14, edited by Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1990). 
2 Michel Foucault, Le Gouvernement de soi et des autres, Cours au Collège de France, 1982-83, 5 January 1983, 4-5. 
‚Et par ‘pensée’, je voulais dire une analyse de ce qu’on pourrait appeler des foyers d’expérience, où 
s’articule les uns sur les autres: premièrement, les formes d’un savoir possible ; deuxièmement, les matrices 
normatives de comportement pour les individus ; et enfin des modes d’existence virtuels pour des sujets 
possible.‚  
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Both John Dewey and Michel Foucault were committed to avoiding polemic exchanges as a 
matter of ethical self-formation, as well as the best path to consistent scientific (Wissenschaft-
liche) rigor.  Both, however, were frequently attacked, and while Dewey consistently sought to 
be direct and respectful in his responses, when he was misunderstood repeatedly, and see-
mingly willfully, the edge of his irritation showed through.  His evident aggravation, for ex-
ample in exchanges with Bertrand Russell, was clarifying as some of his Yankee reserve was 
stripped away as he tried once again to make his position clear and plausible, if not to Russell 
at least to others.3  
Michel Foucault, although operating with a radically different style of writing and 
genre and in a different cultural context than Dewey, nonetheless made it his practice to avoid 
responding directly to the frequent and pointed attacks on his work.  Instead, Foucault used 
the interview form extensively as a venue for clarification of his own views, in part as a means 
of not having to engage directly with critics.  On those rare occasions when Foucault did take 
up the criticisms leveled at him heads-on, and responded directly to those posing them, his 
answers proved to be illuminating.4  This observation is not to say that if only Dewey and 
Foucault had adopted a more polemic mode it would have been a good thing, but only that 
after enduring rebukes and distortions stoically, when they did turn their frustration directly 
at their critics, the pent up irritation provided a powerful and lucid articulation of their ideas.   
Both Dewey and Foucault agreed that thinking arose in the context of problems.  As 
neither thinker was ever quite satisfied with their own articulations, refinements and re-
statements were frequent.  Foucault, like Dewey, asserted and affirmed that thinking arose in 
problematic situations; that it was about clarifying those situations, and that ultimately it was 
directed towards achieving a degree of resolution of what was problematic in the situation.  
Both agreed that thinking—or inquiry—was not fundamentally about the representations of a 
situation; either those produced by a contemporary thinker or as an exercise directed at histo-
rical materials.  Both agreed that a history of ideas as autonomous entities, distorted not only 
the process of thinking as a practice, but also the reasons for which it had been engaged in, 
often with a certain seriousness and urgency, the first place: that is to say, such approaches 
covered over the stakes.  Both agreed that the stakes involved something experiential and en-
tailed a form of logic (or in Foucault’s later vocabulary a mode of ‘veridiction’), in which the 
thinker could not help but be involved.   
Dewey’s metric of thinking was reconstruction: the use of intellectual instrumentalities 
to intervene in a discordant, indeterminate or merely deficient situation guided by the metric 
of the deeply and inclusively human.  Dewey wrote a great deal in his vast corpus about what he 
considered key aspects of the form, as well as the parameters of the deeply and inclusively hu-
                                                 
3 On this episode with Russell, see Tom Burke, Dewey’s New Logic, A Reply to Russell (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1994). 
4 One of the very best examples: L’Impossible Prison.  
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man might be, albeit without using this terminology.  It is in that sense that his work can be 
considered a kind of philosophical anthropology.   
Foucault worked incessantly via details of historical situations assembled and given 
form through genealogical operations.  The point of such work was to show that thinking—
and inquiry—about previous problems had yielded solutions that not only could have been 
otherwise, but also at least until the change in course of his later lectures, were deficient and 
even nefarious.  As opposed to Dewey, Foucault offered only sporadic, punctual observations 
about the specifics of logical judgments or evaluations that so obviously permeated his work.  
Although frequently oblique, the critical intent of everything Foucault wrote, both in the sense 
of demonstrating in a unique and original manner the limitations of previous solutions and of 
judging them, or at least providing reasons to do so, is impossible to ignore.   
For both thinkers, the attacks and responses turned on the stakes, real or imaginary, in 
their understandings of truth, statements, and the nature of inquiry—in modernity, however 
differently defined.  In that light, a preliminary comparison between Dewey and Foucault on 
these topics might prove of interest.   
 
Dewey: Inquiry and Experience  
 
The word ‚logical‛: a signification that is determined by connection with operations of 
inquiry which are under-taken because of the existence of a problem, and which are 
controlled by the conditions of that problem-since the ‚goal‛ is to resolve the problem 
which evokes inquiry.5  
 
Dewey engaged in an extended series of unsatisfactory exchanges with Bertrand Russell over 
the nature of logic, following the publication of Dewey’s book, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, in 
1938.6  One of Dewey’s most pointed responses to Russell is found in his article ‚Propositions, 
Warranted Assertibility and Truth‛ published in the March 1941 Journal of Philosophy.   Dewey 
declaims that his philosophic position turns fundamentally on understanding what he means 
by the inter-connected terms inquiry and experience.  For Dewey, the object and occasion of 
thinking was an experience of problems in the world that catalyzed inquiry into those pro-
blems in order to clarify and resolve them.  Such a search for clarification and resolution, of 
course, was not assured success.  Further, for Dewey, the resolution of one problem often led 
to the opening of another one: such was the nature of inquiry.   
 
[a]ll knowledge, or warranted assertion, depends upon inquiry and that inquiry is truisti-
cally connected with what is questionable (and questioned) involves a skeptical element, or 
what Peirce called ‚fallibilism.‛7 
 
Dewey opposes his problem-oriented, inquiry-based, fallibilistic approach to what he polemi-
cally, if accurately, refers to as Russell’s ‚dogmatic understanding.‛  Here any proposition de-
                                                 
5 John Dewey, Logic, a Theory of Inquiry (New York: Henry Holt, 1938), 120.  
6 See Tom Burke, Dewey’s New Logic, A Reply to Russell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). 
7 Ibid., 171.  
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ployed in the process of inquiry stands alone and can be taken to be self-evidently true or false 
before being put to use in relation to a specific problem and a particular process of inquiry.  
Rebutting Russell, Dewey is emphatic that propositions are neither the object of inquiry nor its 
elements; rather propositions function as the instruments—or equipment—of inquiry.  During 
the course of an inquiry, propositions will be scrutinized or examined not as to their truth or 
falsity, but rather as to their ‚relevancy and efficacy of their subject-matter with respect to the 
problem in hand.‛8  Everything depends on the problem, the tools, and the situation, not on a 
priori elements or fixed rules as components of inquiry.   
As Dewey had argued at length in his Logic, the complementary term to propositions is 
judgments.   
 
Judgment may be identified as the settled outcome of inquiry.  It is concerned with the con-
cluding objects that emerge from inquiry in their status of being conclusive.  Judgment in 
this sense is distinguished from propositions.  The content of the latter is intermediate *<+; 
while judgment, as finally made, has direct existential import.9 
 
Propositions (understood as tools, instrumentalities, equipment) will almost inevitably have to 
be refined and modified as the inquiry proceeds.  This modification might entail a more pre-
cise specification of a problem and/or the possible solutions available.  In any case, it is the 
problem that is the determining factor in the form and function of a proposition.  There is no a 
priori status of ‚simplicity‛ or ‚elementary-ness‛ that applies as the metric in all situations, as 
Russell argued.  Inquiry into particular situations cannot know in advance what tools it re-
quires.   
For Dewey, inquiry is not a question of epistemology, but rather of the logic of prag-
matic situations and interventions.  Inquiry operates into and within specific conditions, not 
outside them.  Dewey calls such conditions existential.  It is only by engaged observation with 
existential conditions that a true experiment can be undertaken.  When propositions are de-
ployed, modified and reformulated in this manner they attain the status of: ‚warranted 
assertion.‛10 
Such a process produces objects:  
 
The name objects will be reserved for subject-matter so far as it has been produced and 
ordered in settled form by means of inquiry; proleptically, objects are objectives of inquiry.11 
 
This process of constructing objects takes place in all scientific work.  Knowing how to ap-
proach a problem, how to think about it, how to design and conduct an inquiry, never starts de 
novo.  Rather, it builds upon while modifying prior work.  When one is doing inquiry, expe-
rimental science, one is always dealing with objects; objects that were products and can then 
be used as tools, but not things directly encountered in the world.   
                                                 
8 Ibid., 177.  
9 Dewey, Logic, 120. 
10 Ibid., 4. 
11 Ibid., 119 
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Finally, even once a situation becomes determinate, its significance cannot be reduced 
to or evaluated uniquely by formal conditions of internal coherence.  It is at this point that a 
stepping-back, a reflective evaluation, becomes pertinent.  Its evaluative pertinence, however, 
can only be ultimately judged by how things work once the inquirer returns to the inquiry.  
Since at least 1920, broadly speaking, Dewey had called this whole process reconstruction.   
 
Reconstruction can be nothing less than the work of developing, of forming, of producing 
(in the literal sense of the word) the intellectual instrumentalities which will progressively 
direct inquiry into the deeply and inclusively human—that is to say, moral—facts of the 
present scene and situation.12 
 
According to Dewey, the challenge of reconstruction—while having a certain generality—also 
has an urgency under conditions in which the technical accomplishments of science were ex-
panding as well as separating from the older moral base in which it was held they used to be 
embedded.  However questionable the last assertion may be, the diagnosis retains an actuality 
that would be hard to gainsay.   
 
Foucault: Thinking and Intensifying Venues of Experience  
 
These three elements—forms of a possible knowledge, normative matrices of 
comportment, modes of virtual existence for possible subjects—these are three things, 
or rather it is the articulation of these three things that one can call, I believe, ‘foyer 
d’expérience.’13  
 
Throughout his career, Foucault paid keen attention to a domain, or set of domains, that 
straddle the arena of inquiry in which Dewey’s propositions and judgments operated.  On the 
one hand, this claim is self-evident, although someone else will have to work out the details of 
how énoncés and serious speech acts might be compared with Dewey’s propositions and judg-
ments in the period surrounding the publication of The Archaeology of Knowledge.  In Foucault’s 
later work, especially in his lectures at the Collège de France, however, many of these conside-
rations are present as well.   
On the other hand, Foucault had worked through these considerations and at least tem-
porally settled on a different approach: one whose object was no longer pronouncedly episte-
mic.  Rather, it was critical in the senses mentioned above but equally, and this is supported 
by his repeated returns to Kant in the last five years or so of his life, of a libratory dimension in 
that establishing critical limitations might be the first step towards an exit from minority to-
wards maturity.  That critical dimension, it seems fair to assert, turned on the identification of 
what Foucault called foyers d’expérience—intensifying, catalyzing and transformative venues—
how to think about them, operate within them, and ultimately to reformulate them: perhaps 
                                                 
12 John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1920, new edition 1948), xxvii. 
13 Foucault, Le Gouvernement, 5. ‚Ces trois éléments—formes d’un savoir possible, matrices normatives de 
comportements, modes d’existence virtuels pour des sujets possibles—ce sont ces trois choses, ou plutôt c’est 
l’articulation des ces trois choses que l’on peut appeler, je crois, « foyer d’expérience. » ‚  
 
Rabinow: Dewey and Foucault 
16 
 
even to reconstruct them.  Such work of reformulation entailed examining the previous forms 
that had been articulated as responses to a specific set of historical problems, thereby making 
them available for a different use or set of uses: as intellectual instrumentalities to illuminate 
contemporary problems and possible solutions.   
The quotes cited above as epigrams are striking in their future orientation: possible 
sciences, normative fields and virtual modes of existence of possible subjects.  Of course, there 
is an archaeological aspect to this formulation: it shows that the task is to provide historical 
detail of a genealogical sort about how each of these coordinates took shape and how they 
were combined; thereby showing in principle that each of the objects as well as their relation-
ships could well have been different.  Foucault, however, was struggling to do something he 
had been extremely reluctant to do previously: articulate the terms of possible solutions.  
Here, at least temperamentally, he differs dramatically from Dewey who ardently advocated 
and proposed solutions both conceptual and institutional.  Dewey’s undaunted American 
pragmatism, as it were, here contrasts with Foucault’s French pathos and passionate reserve.   
Although exactly what Foucault’s problem (or series of problems) consisted in might 
seem obvious, such assurance would be mistaken.  As Arpad Szakolczai demonstrated in his 
excellent book, Max Weber and Michel Foucault, Parallel Life-works, Foucault, like Weber and 
Nietzsche was constantly in search of exactly what he was seeking to know.  That searching 
and re-evaluation, of course, was in each case a form of inquiry and carried with it, at least the 
hope of one form or another of reconstruction.14 
Foucault’s problem: How to invent a form of philosophy that would rebound on thin-
king subjects and those with whom he was working, so as to provide a missing dimension to 
the experience of thinking.  In his last three years of lectures Foucault wrestled with the ele-
ments and objects of inquiry that he had built during the processes of previous inquiries.  He 
experimented with a new type of genealogy of problems and solutions for ethical practice.   
He identified three major forms of reflexivity and how those forms, while not being 
epochal, had been crafted responses to specific historical problems.  By so doing, Foucault was 
not so far from Dewey’s general formulations of the relations of problems and thinking except 
that Foucault was not in search of a general formulation; quite the contrary.  Foucault was in 
search of an anthropology of sorts; one in which anthropos was that being, whose constant 
quest was to invent forms in which logos and ethos could be made to meet the demands of the 
day, as Max Weber put it.15  Of course, those demands varied historically as did what consti-
tuted a solution that met them.  Foucault, however, was no relativist, just because a form could 
be identified as historical, did not mean it was either adequate or satisfactory; quite the con-
trary.   
Foucault produced an analytic schema of three types of reflexivity: memory, medita-
tion and method.  The problem was basically: given that it was impossible and undesirable to 
return to previous solutions to previous problems, could one take up the elements and objects 
of the past in such a way that they could be used both to diagnose the current unsatisfactory 
                                                 
14 Arpad Szakolczai, Max Weber and Michel Foucault, Parallel Life-works (London: Routledge, 1998). 
15 Max Weber, ‚Science as a Vocation‛ in The Vocation Lectures, edited by David Owen and Tracy Strong 
(Indianapolis: Hacking, 2004). 
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situation and to proceed to craft a better diagnosis of contemporary problems and contem-
porary practices of thinking that would lead to a type of ramifications that would literally save 
the subject—but also philosophy.    
 
What is philosophy?  
 
We will call ‘philosophy’ the form of thought that asks what it is that enables the subject to 
have access to the truth and which attempts to determine the conditions and limits of the 
subject’s access to truth.16 
 
What is spirituality?  
 
the search, practice and experience through which the subject carries out the necessary 
transformations on himself in order to have access to the truth.  We will call spirituality then 
the set of these researches, practices and experiences which may be purifications, ascetic 
exercises, renunciations, conversions of looking, modifications of existence etc., which are 
not for knowledge but for the subject, for the subject’s very being, the price to be paid for 
access to the truth.17 
 
Since it is only through one of a number of forms of askesis that the philosophic subject can 
attain access to the truth, Foucault’s initial task was to explore what those practices were.  And 
how those practices articulated with what was considered to be the goal to be attained.  Such 
practices will, by definition, change the subject.  There will be:  
 
effects which I will call a ‘rebound’ (retour), effects of the truth on the subject.  [   ] The truth 
enlightens the subject.18 
 
The present problem for Foucault is clearly and strongly diagnosed as the type of philosophy 
operating in modernity.  The reason for this is that for Foucault it is only knowledge and 
knowledge alone that gives the subject access to the truth.   
 
And the consequence is that the access to truth, whose sole condition is henceforth know-
ledge, will find reward and fulfillment in nothing else but the indefinite development of 
knowledge.  The point of enlightenment and fulfillment, the moment of the subject’s trans-
figuration by the ‘rebound effect’ on himself of the truth he knows, and which passes 
through, permeates, and transfigures his being, can no longer exist.19 
 
Foucault’s diagnosis is strikingly parallel to that of Max Weber in ‚Science as a vocation,‛ 
where he posited the conditions of modern science to be an ever-increasing specialization of 
knowledge domains set within a horizon of infinite duration and no prospect of completion.  
                                                 
16 Michel Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, edited by Arnold Davidson and Frédéric Gros (New York: 
Picador, 2005), 15. 
17 Ibid., 15. 
18 Ibid., 16. 
19 Ibid., 18. 
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For Weber, this state of affairs was simply the condition of knowledge and knowing in 
modernity and it was the challenge and task of those who’s calling was the pursuit of know-
ledge to come to terms with these conditions.  Following Nietzsche, Weber told his student 
audience with tart contempt that it was only the ‚big children‛ in editorial offices and 
university chairs who believed or promised anything else.20 
Foucault’s version is less tart and presents what amounts to a diagnosis as well as the 
challenge of inventing something different.   
 
If we define spirituality as being the form of practices which postulate that, such as it is, the 
truth can transfigure and save the subject, then we can say that the modern age of the rela-
tions between the subject and truth begin when it is postulated that, such as he is, the subject 
is capable of truth, but that, such as it is, the truth cannot save the subject.21 
 
The problem, in a word, is what might come after modernity?  
 
Conclusion  
There are some striking passages in Dewey’s 1948 introduction to the re-edition of his Recon-
struction in Philosophy, ‚Reconstruction 25 years later,‛ that bear an eerie resonance to Fou-
cault’s claims about the problem of thinking today.  Dewey takes up the theme of technology-
oriented science and its relations with moral concerns and problems.  To those who advocate 
that science needs a counter-weight and all we need do is institute ethics alongside science, 
Dewey is impatient.  Such a position, he writes,  
 
appears to assume that we already have in our possession, ready-made, so to say, the morals 
that determine the ends for which the greatly enhanced store of means should be used.  The 
practical difficulty in the way of rendering radically new ‚means‛ into servants of ends 
framed when the means at our disposal were of a different kind is ignored.  But much more 
important than this, with respect to theory or philosophy, is the fact that it retains intact the 
divorce between some things as means and mere means and other things as ends and only 
ends because of their own essence or inherent nature.  Thus, in effect, though not in intent, 
an issue which is serious enough to be moral is disastrously evaded.22 
 
That evasion continues today—and that is a problem.    
 
                                                 
20 Foucault, Hermeneutics, ‚We can no longer think that access to the truth will complete the subject. Know-
ledge will simply open out onto the indefinite dimension of progress, the end of which is unknown and the 
advantage of which will only every be realized in the course of history by the institutional accumulation of 
bodies of knowledge, or the psychological or social benefits to be had from having discovered the truth after 
having taken such pains to do so,‛ 19.  
21 Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 19. 
22 John Dewey, ‚Reconstruction As Seen Twenty-Five Years Later,‛ in Reconstruction see n. 13 above, xxxvii-
xxxviii. 
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